~

Dear Miss Leung, 

As I appear incapable of designating extension not comprised by my outward world, the resulting essay is dedicated to our correspondence on the cave.*At Birkbeck it is insisted we write for a five year old, so please forgive turn-of-phrase.

~

Malebranche claims, against Descartes, that we have no clear and distinct idea of the mind. What does he mean by this claim? How successfully does he defend it?

Early Modern Philosophy of Mind Essay. 4^th May 2021
Birkbeck ID. 13192167. (3267 words).

INTRODUCTION

Although claiming we have no clear and distinct idea of the (Soul), Malbranche also conjectures we do not need it, 'since our consciousness of it does not involve us in error' (Malebranche 1674 p.239). From diagnostic, the clarity of Descartes cogito ergo sum emerges unscathed. Analysis is undertaken through unity of Soul against Multiplicity of other, emphasizing the important role of imagination for the Cartesian thinker. Imaginal ‘triangulation’ determines thinker from thought-about, contemplating light and shade towards each. Malebranche’s battleground of consciousness and inner sensation from The Search after Truth and Elucidation Eleven is framed instead as a contested union of idea between contrasted dimensions. Perhaps we all carry the clear and distinct notion but without analogy have trouble seeing it? It would not be fair to suggest Malebranche, as may be speculated of the modern Southern undergrad, as spearchucking at Descartes. Instead we find difficult disciple in 17^th century retreat sounding master through. The great whale of the cogito emerges from unconscious caves Malebranche tries in vain to fathom, yet cannot. In doing so we consider two gardens, Amaterasu’s within and Socrates’ without.

~

PROLEGOMENA

Cogito ergo sum (Henceforth Cogito) is 'the' famous takehome in re-reading Descartes Meditations. The importance of this residue is an irrefutable discernment of existence, stemmed from doubt, questioning validity of everything. Throughout the Meditations, 'clear and distinct' becomes familiar terminology, Cartesian: "I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive clearly and distinctly is true" (Descartes, 1641 p.24).

MIND, MATTER & BROTH

In beginning our voyage, we need clarify ‘clearly and distinctly’ body and soul, the ambiguity inbetween. Cogito provisions distinction. Chief feature in mapping from cogito is atomicity of assertion. Mathematically two axes can be posited, spacetime (substance of matter), against insubstantial mind. Descartes and Malebranche agree it impossible to think without extension, that living thought requires perambulation. The essence of this perambulation world is matter.

Whereas Descartes' sitting by the fire, read-by-all of First Meditation, is a manifestation of mind, its extension is constructed through material description. It is as if Malebranche turns on the light, affirming he sees and understands everything in front of him except the light. From physics this seems reasonable, but does philosophy hold? The picture is clear, but how do we see the picture? Malebranche then is questioning Descartes assertions (1) that we know the seer itself seeing its sensation better than what is seen; and (2) that we lack impression (clear and distinct) of what we are as a seer and the nature of what is seeing. Malebranche and Descartes differ (3) about God.

Prior to advancement, let us change the canvas, "Nature teaches me, through these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it—intermingled with it, so to speak—so that it and I form a unit. If this weren’t so, I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt but would perceive the damage in an intellectual way, like a sailor seeing that his ship needs repairs." (Descartes quoted in Arnauld’s Fourth Objection, 1642 p.59). 

The senses 'like a ship', borrowed from Augustine (Arnauld, 1642), take us towards common ground. The journey begins, has duration, ends. Inbetween, Descartes somewhat ignores the senses, acknowledging undertaken sensual passage abstractly. Malebranche, at crow’s nest, spies clearly but orients position. Duality posits intermingled body and soul, Captain and Ship. The soul's voyage perhaps clear and distinct for both Augustine and Descartes, but connection is axial. Dualists separates yolk from sack, in that sensory voyage outside iterates forward inner mind. Malebranche acknowledges this (Box 1, below), but objects inwardly. Malebranche considers the senses. How much do we know of the unit of the ship?

TRIANGULATING POSITION

Given two contrasting positions, it seems reasonable to suggest we can discern a third. Considering any object, given any superficial aspects or attributes, an essential identity can be 'triangulated' beneath. Cogito speaks of a singular One, deep within Rene Descartes, that exists in all philosophers. When Descartes doubts mathematics (First Meditation), "two and three added together" (Descartes, 1641 p.14), he is inconspicuously avoiding unity. Malebranche’s argument almost deals against two scales of unit. Descartes' cogito competing against an ambiguous multiplicity, the greater unit Mind & Body, or ship. A complaint from Malebranche on the soul, "we do not know it through its ideas-- we do see it in God; we know it only through consciousness " (Malebranche, 1674 p.237).

Descartes Oneness magnifies outwards into uncertainty, Malebranche's ‘consciousness’ determines an unknowable interior. Cartesian Dualism separates Soul from Material World, but is Malebranche arguing against clear and distinctness of union instead? Let us suggestively return to our argument, substance of mind extension of One, substance of matter Multiplicity.

Figure 1.

• Descartes' Soul as atomic inner unit (cogito);
• Mind & Body extend from an imaginal point (cogito ascertained by Descartes), outwardly (the ship);
• Material World, outside, suggestively unclear to cogito, illuminated from within.

Disagreement now seems cogent by extension. Descartes atomic cogito triangulates outwards, Malebranche's 'inner sensation' begins outwardly, but hiking back towards the source of the Cartesian river. Descartes 'idea' sails, but Malebranche's ambitious imagination struggles back. Has Malebranche lost sight of Descartes’ atomicity?

Malebranche posits four ways of knowing. He acknowledges Soul and World. “Only God do we know through Himself” (Malebranche, 1674 p.236) speaks Material World inwardly to Soul even beyond our knowledge, “while we can see all things in God, it does not follow that we in fact do so – we see in God only the things of which we have ideas, and there are things we perceive without ideas, or know only through sensation.” (p.237). Soul exists, but idea of it unknowable. Malebranche walks a two-way street. The triangulation 'Mind & Body' provides ideas of Material World through sensation, but of itself is union, indistinct. Descartes looks outward, clear soul doubtful of world. Malebranche looks inward, compassing clear and distinct ideas, but, as churchman, never reaching One. 

My inclination is to agree with Descartes, acknowledging the difficulty Malebranche raises. Outwardly, Soul exists (mutually agreed, see Box 1), contemplating Mind & Body and Material World. But does that Mind & Body be clouded (particularly perspective-dependant) preclude idea of it? We are almost considering two separate gardens. Mind & Body for Malebranche holds idea, but deferringly idea of it is in pursuit. If an arc of triangulation emanates outwards from cogito isn’t it the only way of knowing? Does Malebranche intuitively see idea of Soul without realizing it, despite competing ideas?

Lets negotiate idea in Malebranche and Descartes. Descartes on ideas, "Undoubtably, the ideas that represent substances to me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality than the ideas that merely represent modes or accidents." (Descartes quoted in Moreau, 2000 p.93 sic) For Malebranche, bodies are known because “when we see things as they are in God, we always see them in perfect fashion,” and “What is lacking to our knowledge of extension, figures, and motion is the shortcoming not of the idea representing it but of our mind considering it.” (Malebranche, 1674 p.237) The claim is superficially against Descartes, but note change in perspective. Descartes' modes or accidents become for Malebranche shortcoming of mind. Descartes language guides with precision, but Malebranche's 'mind alone' leaves us a bit lost at sea.

In this essay I will assert that (a) cogito uses Mind & Body to spatially abstract matter through imagination – enabling us to perceive extension regardless of matter-of-fact what is actually there, and (b) that matter is perceived through mind, cogito as knower perceiving known. Malebranche more often treats perceiving (ship), not Descartes imaginal perceiver (captain of the ship) through his discourse.

Cogito can perhaps then be alluded akin a cinema projector, projecting through Mind & Body, onto Material World. Malebranche acknowledges a projecting, sees the painting, but doubts the mechanism projecting between these two truths. This ocean may be impossible, but is Descartes’ Soul between the two shores?

SHADE, LIGHT & PERSPECTIVE

To turn the light on in Descartes’ study, I am suggesting an asymmetry. Descartes cogito clearly and distinctly sees through, but Malebranche’s clear Material World fumbles introspectively inward.

Figure 2.
DESCARTES Light into Dark. Mind enlightening matter. Matter shaded by doubt.	MALEBRANCHE Dark into Light. Matter enlightened by obscure mind. Mind profoundly obscured.

Is this what Malebranche means? Perceiver full knowledge of matter, perceived mind alone obscured. To be poetic, “The Sun that illuminates minds is not like the sun that illuminates bodies; it is never eclipsed, and it penetrates everything without losing its strength” (Search VI.I.i, OC 2:247; LO 410 quoted in Lennon, 2000 p.21) and “When we look at a star, according to Malebranche, what we actually see is not the star in the heavens but an idea that represents the star.” (Lennon, 2000 p.18). In the same volume, Jolley notes of later writings, Malebranche insists “the mind is a lumen illuminatum (illuminated light), not a lumen illuminans (illuminating light)” and “the mind finds only the darkness of sensations in itself.” (Jolley, 2000 p.33)

Malebranche does affirm God within, enlightening “our mind with His own substance” (Search III.II.vii, Malebranche, 1674 p.237). The claim against Descartes is dependent on perspective. ‘His own substance’ is suggestive of inner unity. “While we can see all things in God, it does not follow that we in fact do so – we see in God only the things of which we have ideas, and there are things we perceive without ideas, or know only through sensation.”  (Malebranche, 1674 p.237) Soul, frustratingly for Malebranche, cannot be ‘seen’ because God is unfathomably infinite. Idea of Soul impossible, crossed only ‘through sensation’. I argue this ‘line of sensation’ as train of thought, the journey mitigated in Descartes writings as cogito, moreover, his imagination.

MALEBRANCHE'S DEFENSE - ELUCIDATION 11

On the basis our defense of the soul may retreat to a point infinitely within, let us look at Malebranche's outward defense. "I even think that I have sufficiently proved in the third book of the Search after Truth, that we have no clear idea of our soul, but only consciousness or inner sensation of it, and that we thus know it much less perfectly than we do extension." (1677-8 p.633) With protractor out, first co-ordinate for Malebranche's defense is Elucidation Eleven (Malebranche 1677-8), later reflection on The Search, demonstrating later weight of his thought.

My argument is that ‘inner sensation’ denotes obscurity of union, not ambiguity of mind. This gambit wins significant pieces if held, against the elucidation. Can we justify a two-tiered position, atomic soul versus an ambiguous polymer of 'ship'? We can then return to Malebranche's four ways of knowing reflective of later outcome.

Malebranche contrasts clarity of extension to unknowability modifications of soul. He argues colours, tastes or perceptions - eating melon, seeing blue, demonstrate incomplete knowledge. We instinctively determine by contrast with extension, not its opposite. 'The Cartesians’ he suggests, consider ‘Heat, pain and color’ shaded compared geometrical roundness (p.634). Reading the elucidation as a whole, Malebranche has difficulty ascribing I - the single point that feels, seeing, discerning, as opposed the 'triangulation' capturing knowledge.

Our gambit is that soul retains an inner unity, the viewing I, against his 'ambiguity of union', a contestable sensual granularity. The reader's distinction between body and mind is clouded through ‘simple perception’ during his passages, but despite decreasing clarity, it feels we haven’t 'split the egg' - the I of mind and the union of mind apprehending phenomena has not been separated from matter - three partitions, not two. The ambiguity of Mind & Body may be water-tight, but he doesn't challenge our captaincy.

Led along murky seventeenth century lanes now, tasting sugar, colouring apples, we lose sight of atomic soul. Although shaded, Malebranche's conscious sensation is partially computable. We can be 'Cartesian' today and agree this territory indistinct. With hindsight of The Computer, knowledge of the disputed domain has deepened- visual recognition for example demonstrating possibilities without demonstrating Machine Soul. Ambiguity of union, not of subject against object. As such, my scales weigh against the elucidation, countering ambiguity equally between contending matter and soul.

His consciousness argument breaks down further. By modern retort, extension is not mere visual geometry. All five senses exhibit levels of abstract material interaction computationally. Despite clear material aspects, colour to wavelength for example, the entirety of the phenomena requires more than elusive Soul alone. Malebranche seems to mistreat the division through the 17^th century fog.

OCTAVES & THE WAX

Descartes Second Meditation orientates opposition by way of a 'piece of wax'. Understanding matter is addressed via two contrasted positions. The first material perspective a superficially almost geometrical reading of the situation, is only illuminated by a second co-ordinate. The corporeal perspective is necessarily shifted, in that by considering, nature is comprehended by Soul. The second co-ordinate is almost arbitrarily forward, informed by unified understanding the wax is recognised by the change a-to-b of the thinker in movement. It is the third, contemplated position that I refer to as 'triangulating'. We discern from a and b both internal cogito moving, and, in process, counterpart 'soul' of wax ('hidden' co-ordinate made known). Descartes has, to use Malebranche's lexicon, 'known through conjecture'. Understanding the wax by token an almost reflective likened Soul in recognising against ones moving self.

Malebranche contrasts clarity of mind through the octave. We discern musical extension, he argues, in that octaves compose harmony. This becomes a recipe to material understanding after which it becomes clear and distinct, a recipe prohibited (by idea) of the soul. The 'soul' of quiche however is not approximated by a simple breaking of eggs. To 'taste like x' in material terms is comparative. Descartes reasoning suggests contrasting initial point by extension (contemplation through time), in theory returning resulting likenesses to Alice Coltrane’s music or quiche (or both) from arbitrary experiential sensation. This sounds more approximate to reality, than mastering mathematical scale between self and other. Through experience I discern vegan quiche, despite Malebranche's recipe. A more innocent, less mechanical likeness. Alice Coltrane's chords without measuring parameter.

To parallel the octave further, Descartes example suggests something 'soulful' beneath, not extension- beauty of the music, taste of the quiche, despite material dimensions. There's something about alice coltrane is clear and distinct, but inexpressibly ‘about it’. Malebranche contrasts separating soul from sensory, but struggles to indicate this veiled soul behind his apples.

I have now unfortunately accused Malebranche of confusing clarity. He has juxtaposed matter against a shaded union, not against Soul itself. Descartes retreat, modern computation and the octave all appear to suggest this. For Malebranche, we appear something lost at sea. Let us return to The Search for orientation.

MALEBRANCHE'S DEFENSE - SEARCH AFTER TRUTH

Book Three, Part Two: Ch. 7 of The Search after Truth discerns ‘how’ we know. The four ways of perceiving for Malebranche are by:

   i. Themselves
  ii. Their ideas
 iii. Consciousness
 iv. Conjecture

Whereby only God can know himself (i).

Returning to our argument, ideas are known through an imaginal union of Soul and Material World (Figure 3) (ii). Malebranche’s Consciousness (iii) is the projector of this union, not the atomic Soul. Furthermore, from the octave argument, knowing through idea alone is not enough - Soul behind Material World idea is also part of Descartes’ equation. This confuses Malebranche’s separation, occluded within against clear and distinct geometry. The octave is irrelevant without identifying ‘other’. The ambiguous domain becomes that between cogito and superficial reality (of Souls). Perhaps it is possible to have clear and distinct idea of ‘projector’ afterall?

Figure 3.

Clouded but not impossible
“The shortcoming is not of the idea representing it but of our mind considering it.” Malebranche complains (Malebranche 1674 p.237). Unfortunately it appears mind inseparable from the ideas it considers, as the way of seeing. Surely if perfect material ideas are possible through this apparatus, shortcoming could perhaps be argued a clutter of overlaying ideas, or even in terms of Descartes’ (see above) modes or accidents. The paradox instead appears to be that without imagination the idea between these two shores, as distinct from Matter or Soul, cannot be seen except by analogy. This is perhaps understandable clearly and distinctly by both Descartes and Malebranche, on the waiver ‘not in material terms’.

The turning passage for Malebranche seems the following:

Because I argue Soul within ‘nature of bodies’, Malebranche’s shortcoming appears to be the lost co-ordinate cogito between shores, confusing perfection of God with imperfection of an inherent incompleteness of Soul (hence the voyage analogy). At this stage fathomability becomes irrelevant. Malebranche’s avenues of the divine stem from this boundary of perfection, and this seems an overreach. It seems fair to draw the line against Malebranche’s perfectionist Cartesian tendency and agree instead the distinct shores of Descartes. Perhaps Descartes’ malicious demon is capable of gentleness after all?

A VERDICT

Three aspects of contentions have been suggested against Descartes. (1) That of knower and known. Descartes duality has been mitigated by dividing three parts: Soul, Mind & Body, Material World. Soul by my reckoning retains clear and distinctness. Mind & Body is occluded but not impossibly unknown. Material World is less clear and distinct than Soul because Soul is part of the phenomena of Material World Descartes questions and because Malebranche considers Material World only against an occluded middle, ‘between two shores’. (2) Impossibility of knowing knower, what knows? Descartes imagination and perspective seems to have avoided Malebranche’s difficult questions, cogito crosses the ocean. Malebranche rightly weighs Mind greater than atomic Soul,* so is disappointed not to elucidate something more angelically taxonomic. He struggles backwards from the profoundly more difficult ‘ship’, pronouncing full journey inwards impossible. He must be credited for this, but perhaps hasn’t mastered the Cartesian imagination. It is to Descartes credit that he has broached divide at all. (3) God. Through analogy we discern somewhat differing perception of God - Descartes transcendent God through emanating self is not foreign to Malbranche’s illumination. Malebranche considers illuminator and illuminated, but we must note his asymmetry in doing so, pointing Descartes torch inwards, towards the more problematically analogous ‘ocean’. As said in one seminar – God often seems the eventual excuse of almost any 17th century thinker. *In Chinese 精, 神 and 氣 are all discernibly problematic translations of mind.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I disagree Malebranche’s Soul “more different from the body than a square is from a circle” (Malebranche, 1677-8 p.638). On the contrary, they appear somewhat identical, the contention being mode of extension. As for the “clear idea of the soul that, no matter how I try, I cannot find in myself.”, perhaps Malebranche’s fever should be pointed towards Farid ud-Din Attar’s reflectual Simurgh of The Conference of the Birds? He who knows himself knows his Lord. God will be perhaps most pleased with Malebranche for, on release from Socrates’ shackles, taking the courage to journey inwards, sounding through the cogito’s whale song within. Clear and distinct idea of the mind may seem impossible, but that depends on Cartesian perspective.

REFERENCES

Malebranche (1674) The Search after Truth, Transl. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

Descartes, R., (1641) Meditations, In Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings, Transl. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff And Dugald Murdoch. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Arnauld, (1642) Fourth Objection, In Objections to the Meditations and Descartes’s Replies. [online] in the version presented at www.earlymoderntexts.com [Accessed 25^th January 2021]

Moreau, D., (2000) The Malebranche-Arnauld Debate, In The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, Edited by Steven Nadler. 1^st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000

Lennon, T. M. (2000) Malebranche and Method, In The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, Edited by Steven Nadler. 1^st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000

Jolley, Nicholas, (2000) Malebranche on the Soul, In The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, Edited by Steven Nadler. 1^st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000

Malebranche (1677-8) Elucidations, In The Search after Truth, Transl. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997